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The Role of the EU  
in the African Peace  
and Security Architecture**

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**The Role of the EU in the African Peace and Security  
Architecture:  
An evaluation of African Peace Facility-funded activities**

**Willy Kokolo**

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## **Executive Summary**

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the cornerstone of the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted in 2007 by the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). European efforts have been concentrating on operationalising APSA through the African Peace Facility (APF). The first aim of the paper is to provide an overview of the relevant European, African and joint institutions involved. The functioning of the APF and of the APSA are thus explained, as well as the genesis of the JAES. Then, the paper proceeds to a dual evaluation of the APF: first, examining its functional impact, that is to say the outcomes it achieves on the ground regardless of any other criteria (APF absolute support to the APSA); and secondly, with regard to African ownership and alignment with African priorities (APF relative support to the APSA). Finally, in the conclusion the paper compares the two evaluations.

## Introduction

The cooperation between the European Union (EU) and African countries on peace and security issues is a flourishing domain. A study conducted by Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008, p. 186) shows the very positive perceptions African policy-makers have on the EU role in peacekeeping. Yet, EU-African cooperation has not always been so idyllic, not least because of the colonial experience. Thus, waves of so-called 'African renaissance' have been culminated in the creation of the African Union (AU) whose Constitutive Act allows intervention in the internal affairs of a member state on the ground of "grave circumstances"<sup>1</sup>. Based on the principle of 'African solutions to African problems' (Carbone, 2013, p. 121), the AU shows a willingness on the part of African policy-makers to safeguard peace and security on the continent by Africans. This has led to the designing of a new set of institutions commonly known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). A generic term, the APSA nonetheless rests on two documents which form its legal basis: the Peace and Security Council Protocol, and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) (Engel and Porto, 2011, p. 16). The ultimate goal of the APSA is to empower the AU to be in charge of African security, thus leaving external actors such as the EU outside of the process. However, because it is still in its infancy, the APSA is far from being fully operational. Therefore, external support is important, though changing in nature. As a report (Vines and Middleton, 2008, p. 16) puts it, "[a]s more African conflicts are addressed by African actors, the EU's involvement is likely to become more focused on financing and technical support rather than direct intervention".

2014 has been considered a landmark year as regards EU-Africa relations. The 4th Euro-Africa summit held in Brussels in April of this year was the occasion to reflect upon the achievements and shortcomings of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), and to establish a roadmap for 2014-2017. Moreover, the year 2014 foresaw the entry into force of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF). Time is thus ripe for contributing to the momentum. As such, the aim of this paper is to evaluate EU's support to the APSA so as to understand the dynamics of the process. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents African, European and joint institutions that are in charge of the cooperation between the EU and the AU in the area of peace and security. The APSA is obviously the focus of the paper as far as African institutions are concerned. In the European side, the African Peace Facility (APF) is the only instrument that is reviewed. Then, section 3 consists of a dual evaluation of the APF. First, APF absolute support to the APSA is assessed, meaning the impact APF-funded activities have on the ground. Then, its relative support is also analysed, that is to say how the APF is performing in relation to African priorities. Finally, section 4 sums up the main findings of the paper and highlights further areas where investigation is needed.

## The Institutional Design of the Euro-Africa APSA cooperation

So as to provide a sound evaluation of EU's support to the APSA, there is first a need to understand the functioning of this architecture and the tools the EU has at its disposal to support it. The term 'Euro-Africa APSA cooperation' has been chosen for two reasons. First, it differs from the broader cooperation between the EU and Africa on peace and security since I am only concerned with the APSA and I am not taking into account the Common Security and Defence

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1 This encompasses war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (African Union, 2000, Art. 4(h))

Policy (CSDP) missions the EU is launching in Africa. Secondly, the Euro-Africa APSA cooperation mentions 'Africa' as a continent to highlight the willingness of the EU to deal with the AU instead of individual African states. Two limitations also derive from this choice. First, member states of each organisation (i.e. the EU and the AU) are not taken into account in my reasoning. Hypotheses of EU member states trying to "Europeanize" their African foreign policy or simply implementing bilateral programmes that are parallel to those of the EU are not considered in this paper (Brosig, 2011, p. 108; 2013, p. 299; Giorgis, 2010, p. 79; Carbone, 2013, p. 122; Pirozzi, 2010, p. 89). Nor are the hegemonic role some African countries intend to play in their respective region (Møller, 2009, p. 1; Vines and Middleton, 2008, pp. 22-23; Klingebiel, et al., 2008, p. 40; Helly, 2009, p. 152). Secondly, I focus on the continent-to-continent level, that is to say the cooperation between the EU and the AU. Other external actors and the need to coordinate at the international level is not part of my reasoning (Giorgis, 2010, p. 81; Brosig, 2011, p. 121).

### **The African framework: institutions of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)**

The APSA is composed of five components. The Political and Security Council (PSC) is the "standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts" (African Union, 2002, art. 2.1). It is meant at providing political leadership, at coordinating the other components, and at generating actions. The Panel of the Wise (PoW) "shall advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission [of the AU] on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa" (African Union, 2002, art. 11.3). Based on the African tradition of elderly wisdom, this advisory body acts in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution and is composed of five members whose contribution to peace and security has been widely acknowledged (Engel and Porto, 2011, p. 19). Together, those two components (the PSC and the PoW) form what Pirozzi (2010, p. 87) calls the "institutional arm" of the APSA, as opposed to the operational arm which is characterised by two other components, namely the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the African Standby Force (ASF). The CEWS is a dual institution which is structured around the Situation Room, "an observation and monitoring centre [...] located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis" (African Union, 2002, art. 12(a)), and "observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms [...] which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room" (African Union, 2002, art. 12(b)). Overall, the CEWS is supposed to provide sound political analysis of the given situations based on qualitative and quantitative indicators (Engel and Porto, 2011, p. 18). The ASF is composed of five regional brigades<sup>2</sup> and is responsible for carrying out a series of civilian and military missions (African Union, 2002, art. 13)<sup>3</sup>.

At this stage, it is important to note that the APSA relies on a decentralised functioning, with its operational arm resting on the fruitful cooperation between the AU on the one hand, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) on the other hand. The PSC Protocol explicitly recognises the role those RECs/RMs play in the overall functioning of the

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2 The regional brigades are the following : the EASBRIG (East Africa), the SADCBRIG (Southern Africa), the ECOBRIG (West Africa), the ECCASBRIG (Central Africa), and the NASBRIG (North Africa). It should be noted that the members of the PoW each represent a region of the ASF.

3 Six scenarios have been envisioned for the ASF: 1) AU/Regional military advice to a political mission, 2) AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission, 3) Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission, 4) AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions, 5) AU Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, 6) AU interventions, e.g. genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly (Cilliers, 2008, pp. 3-4)

APSA (African Union, 2002), and provides indications as to the relations that need to be established between them and the various components of the APSA. The fifth and last component of the APSA is the Peace Fund, an organ created “[i]n order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security” (African Union, 2002, art. 21.1). Since the aim of this fund is purely operational and has nothing to do with capacity-building, I will not take it into account in the course of my reasoning.

A peculiar construct, the APSA has thus been described as a regime (Brosig, 2013, p. 293; 2011; Rye Olsen, 2009, p. 3; Engel and Porto, 2011) or as a “complex of norms, structures, capacities and procedures” (Pirozzi, 2009, p. 11; Salim, cited in Assanvo and Pout, 2007, p. 4). Finally, mention should be made of the fact that the APSA is meant to deal with all stages of conflict and various aspects of security (African Union, 2004, art. 5 and 6).

### **The European framework: rationale and components of the African Peace Facility (APF)**

A financial instrument, the African Peace Facility (APF) has been established in 2003 following a request of African leaders that the EU should have an instrument geared towards supporting African efforts in peace and security (Assanvo and Pout, 2007, p. 23). Entering into force in 2004, the APF is based on three principles: ownership (of Africans), solidarity, and partnership between Africa and Europe (Assanvo and Pout, 2007, p. 23; Le Pere, 2012, p. 271). The legal basis of this instrument is Art. 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific) (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 20). As such, the APF is part of the EDF. This has several implications. First, the APF is not part of the EU budget, but results from allocations from the EDF, a fund which is composed of contributions from EU member states determined via a political agreement (European Development Fund (EDF), 2012). Secondly, the APF can only finance non-lethal procurement, meaning that military and arms expenditures cannot be covered by it<sup>4</sup>. This second shortcoming results from the EDF being labelled a development fund, which makes it compulsory for it to abide by the OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Co-operations and Development – Development Cooperation Directorate) criteria of foreign development aid. Thirdly, because the APF is linked to the EDF which is connected to the ACP group, Northern African states are de facto excluded from the APF and cannot benefit from financial support<sup>5</sup>.

In light of these institutional shortcomings, it might seem inappropriate to focus on the APF as the European instrument to support the APSA. Indeed, other financial tools are also giving support to African peace and security efforts (Assanvo and Pout, 2007, pp. 24-25). Yet, they are instruments that are only used on an ad hoc basis. The APF has the advantage of being institutionalised, thus being reliable, predictable and sustainable (Vervaeke, 2009, p. 78). Besides, since it was established at the request of African policy-makers, one could expect African ownership to be more easily respected with the APF than with any other European instruments.

Originally, the APF has had two pillars. The first is meant to contribute to the Peace Support Operations (PSOs) of the AU by providing them with financial aid. The second aims at building the capacities of the AU through the APSA (Elowson, 2009, p. 25). In 2009, a third pillar was added to

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4 Non-eligible APF expenses are ammunition, arms and military equipment, salaries and training for the military; the cost of carrying troops and soldiers' living expenses are eligible (Pirozzi, 2009, p. 25; African Peace Facility (APF), 2013, p. 8)

5 They can still access APF fundings through the AU but are not privileged interlocutors in this respect.

the APF, namely an Early Response Mechanism (ERM) to “support political mediation efforts undertaken by the AU” (Brosig, 2013, p. 299). Out of those three pillars, it is the first one (PSO) that has been attributed the lion's share of APF resources (88.5%), then capacity-building (9.9%), and only €15m (1.6%) have been earmarked for the ERM for its first term (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 22). In the remainder of the paper, I am only focusing on the capacity-building pillar of the APF since it is the only one that adopts a long-term approach that seeks to empower the AU through support to the APSA.

### **The cooperation framework: the genesis of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)**

Now that both African and European institutions have been reviewed, this sub-section presents the way those institutions interact together. Equation between them results from changing patterns of cooperation between the EU and its African counterparts, a process that has culminated with the adoption of the JAES in 2007. Indeed, Pirozzi (2009, p. 7) writes of a “shift in EU-Africa relations [through] [...] landmark steps”. This document was supposed to herald a new era in EU-Africa relations by setting up the grounds for a “partnership of equals”, thus overcoming the “traditional donor-recipient relationship” (African Union and European Commission, 2007a). A joint strategy between the EU and the AU, the JAES has the potential to equate African expectations with European support. Based on eight partnerships, the JAES ranks “Peace and Security” as the first one. For J. Costa Pereira (2013, p. 16), this is evidence that peace and security is the most salient issue of the EU-Africa relation, and many other commentators have considered this partnership as the one in which results have been the most effective and tangible (Castillejo, 2014, p. 1; Mackie, et al., 2013, p. 8). This partnership on peace and security is divided into three priority actions, which are: (1) enhancing political dialogue, (2) full operationalisation of the APSA, and (3) providing predictable funding for AU peace operations (African Union and European Union, 2007b). Out of these three priority actions, this paper examines only the second one. Excluding political dialogue from my reasoning has a straightforward justification since it has nothing to do with the APSA and capacity-building of the AU. The exclusion of priority action 3 follows my choice not to take into account the first and third pillars of the APF (the PSO and the ERM).

As mentioned earlier, the APF entered into force in 2004, when the JAES had not yet been adopted. Nevertheless, this European instrument adapted quite well to the new framework that was governing EU-Africa relations. As early as 2007, the second pillar of the APF (capacity-building of the AU) became more prominent so as to mirror the priorities put forth in the Peace and Security Partnership (Carbone, 2013, p. 119; Pirozzi, 2010, p. 94). As the APF evaluation report (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 38) puts it, “[t]he key priorities of the Peace and Security Partnership became the objectives of the APF under EDF 10 [from 2008 to 2013]”<sup>6</sup>. The next section questions the performance of the APF in light of this re-prioritisation.

### **The APF capacity-building component and the APSA: a dual evaluation**

Overall, this section evaluates EU's contribution to priority action 2 of the Peace and Security Partnership of the JAES, namely the full operationalisation of the APSA. The AU side is not

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<sup>6</sup> It should also be noted that “[t]oday, the APF is at the centre of the PS Partnership Action 3” (Elowson, 2009, p. 25), meaning that the APF as a whole is in keeping with the three priority actions of the Peace and Security Partnership of the JAES. Yet, as we focus on the second component of the APF, this aspect will not be dealt with here.



considered here, meaning that a series of impediments towards such operationalisation are not analysed (e.g. the lack of political willingness on the part of African officials, the linguistic discrepancy at AU institutional and operational levels between French and English, etc.). Much of this section is based on the in-depth evaluation report of the APF that was published in 2012 (Hendrickson, et al., 2013). The authors of this report claim that “there are a number of factors which make it challenging to assess the impact of APF-funded activities in the area of peace and security in Africa. APF programme interventions [...] have generally not included a detailed monitoring and evaluation framework to measure results” (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 74). Therefore, there is a need to establish criteria of evaluation. Since the APF evaluation report is a detailed and extensive document, the criteria it uses are not tailor-made to the purpose of this paper.

A report published by the German Development Institute asks whether “it [is] actually feasible and [...] [whether] it make[s] sense to apply a set of best practices gleaned from the world of development to all external assistance for the APSA” (Klingebliel, et al., 2008, p. 104). My answer to this question is clearly yes. Development policy involves a great degree of cooperation and partnership, while foreign policy revolving around security issues has traditionally been more unilateral and less concerned with local ownership. In my opinion, this suffices to base the evaluation of the APF on development standards. Moreover, it should be repeated that African ownership, solidarity and partnership are the basis of the APF, and that the JAES is supposed to overcome the traditional “donor-recipient relation” between Europe and Africa. All those principles have been enshrined in key international and European documents pertaining to the realm of development. Of prime importance are the OECD 2005 Paris Declaration and 2008 Accra Agenda for Change (OECD, 2005/2008), the EU 2005 Consensus on Development (European Parliament, European Commission and Council Joint Statement 14820/05, 2005), and the EU 2007 Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour (Council Conclusions 9558/07, 2007). Therefore, the two following criteria will be considered when evaluating APF support to the APSA:

- 1) ownership of local authorities, i.e. the AU and RECs/RMs (*ownership* criterion);
- 2) development programmes based on priorities/needs identified by the local authorities (*alignment* criterion).

However, the APF can also be evaluated as regards the outcomes of the activities it has funded, what Ginsberg and Penksa (2012, p. 98) call the 'functional impact' of an action. While this type of evaluation might seem far less informative as regards APF performance, it nonetheless addresses shortcomings of the European approach per se. As such, besides proceeding to the evaluation of APF relative support to the APSA, evaluation of APF absolute support to the APSA will also be conducted (impact criterion). Table 1 provides an overview of how the data provided by the APF evaluation report fit into my conception of APF evaluation.

Table 1. Comparison between the official evaluation of the APF and my own evaluation.

APF Evaluation Report		JAES Priority Actions	My own evaluation of the APF	
Evaluation Questions	DAC Evaluation Criteria		Type of evaluation	Evaluation Criteria
Relevance of the APF	relevance	all	relative	alignment
Consistency of implementation	relevance + sustainability	all	relative	alignment + ownership
Dialogue and cooperation	effectiveness + sustainability	Priority Action 1	absolute	impact
Operationalising APSA	effectiveness	Priority Action 2	absolute	impact
Predictable and sustainable funding	effectiveness + sustainability + efficiency	Priority Action 3	absolute	impact
Impact on Peace & Security	impact	all	absolute	impact
Coordination and complementarity and EU value added	/	all	/	/
Efficiency of implementation	effectiveness + efficiency	all	absolute	impact

### APF absolute support to the APSA: the impact criterion

The APF “has provided extensive support for operationalisation of APSA which might otherwise not have occurred due to African resource constraints” (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 9). This statement alone suffices to argue that the APF has proved essential as regards the development of APSA structures<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, such support to the APSA has made an indirect contribution to improving the peace and security environment in Africa (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 74). Considering the fact that APF funds account for only 10% of all external contributions to APSA (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 44), APF achievements are undoubtedly to be praised. However, the APF Evaluation Report acknowledges the fact that APF capacity-building has been less decisive than the PSO and ERM pillars as regards such improvements (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, pp. 74-75). This results from a series of flaws characterising APF capacity-building programmes.

First of all, APF contributions to APSA operationalisation have been uneven. This mainly stems from APF programmes targeting mainly the capacities of the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU during the 9th EDF (i.e. the first period of APF funding), leaving RECs/RMs with no support (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 59). This shortcoming was addressed with the 10th EDF (i.e. the second period of APF funding). However, two problems have persisted as regards this support provided at regional level. First, most of the programmes were meant to improve RECs/RMs capacity to operationalise the APSA, but little was done to build their core institutional capacity in the area of financial and project management (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 58). The situation is

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that the APF evaluation report was commissioned by the European Commission, but was conducted by an independent team of evaluators ; thus, bias in favour of the APF could arguably be considered inexistant.

further worsened by the fact that the EU adopts “one-size-fits all conditionalities such as the need for all RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new funds can be disbursed” (African Union, 2010, pp. 69-70). Because the RECs/RMs have each different absorption capacity and needs, this all-encompassing approach is problematic. This leads to the second problem, namely the fact that APF's strategy is focusing at the continental level<sup>8</sup>. As a matter of fact, the EU has no specific strategy dealing with the RECs (Brosig, 2013, p. 299), which is the reason why financial management has been particularly well addressed at the AU level (see annex 1)<sup>9</sup> whereas almost no programmes tackled this issue at the RECs level. So far, the financing of Liaison Offices between the AU and the RECs/RMs has been the only APF-funded activity to remedy the disconnection between continental and regional levels (see annex 1; Pirozzi, 2010, p. 89).

Another critical issue is that of the staffing level. During a conference organised in Addis Ababa in 2009 (Observatoire de l'Afrique, 2009, p. 2), it has been widely acknowledged that “theory is [...] running ahead of practice in the development of the APSA”. Indeed, AU institutions have arguably been influenced by the European Union, but it is still a nascent organisation (Giorgis, 2010, p. 74)<sup>10</sup>. The EU has difficulties in taking into account this parameter as it engages in capacity-building programmes without addressing the staffing issue. Carbone (2013, p. 68) thus speaks of a 'capacity-building vicious circle': “[t]he consequent lack of capacity has therefore led donors to engage in capacity-building, but the recruitment problem is also the main cause of the AU's lack of capacity to absorb donor funds”.

On the contrary, APF support to the ASF is generally considered positive. Indeed, Brosig (2013, p. 299) argues that “[t]he most important EU initiative [in capacity-building] is probably the Amani Africa-Euro RECOMP initiative”, a series of training courses held between 2008 and 2010 targeting the political-strategic level with a view to operationalising the ASF as regards crisis management (Brosig, 2011, p. 111; Elowson, 2009, p. 37). But even in this apparent area of success, shortcomings arouse. First, the Amani cycle operates at the continental level, whereas support to regional training centres mainly stem from bilateral contributions (Elowson, 2009, pp. 36, 40, 44)<sup>11</sup>. As with financial management then, there is a bias in favour of the AU and to the detriment to the RECs/RMs in this area. Secondly, because the Amani cycle originates in the French Euro Recomp programme created in 1997 (Elowson, 2009, p. 37), the EU has somewhat made 'new wine in old bottles' and the programme is thus disconnected from African needs (Elowson, 2009, p. 43). Last but not least, engaging extensively in supporting the ASF can be read as an attempt to make visible contributions that are “easy-to-sell to domestic constituencies because of its

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8 Carbone (2013, pp. 113-114) explains well the rationale underlying this choice; while France wanted the RECs/RMs to be the privileged interlocutors for APF funding, the United Kingdom preferred to deal with the AU as a whole. The consensual decision set the AU as the main actor, allowing the RECs to request funds but provided that the AU agreed on such request.

9 Financial management came to the fore when, after conducting the so-called 'four pillar assessment' (i.e. accounting, external audit, internal controls and procurement), the EU discovered the poor managerial capacity of the AU which led to large amount of financial recovery from the sum disbursed for the AMIS mission (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 57).

10 The similarities between the AU and the EU can also be noted with regards to the joint institutions underpinning the eight partnerships of the JAES (EU and AU Commissions, the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament, etc.)

11 The other side of the coin is that bilateral support tends to be directed at successful training centres like the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, thus creating competition for funds between centres, the latter claiming that they offer comprehensive formation (in order to attract more external support) while they were originally specialising in specific areas

perceived harmlessness” (Klingebiel, et al., 2008, p. 81; Franke, 2009, p. 72). This has two negative consequences. With regards to the entire APSA, the ASF is over-supported in comparison to the other components. Worse, some argue that this focus on training programmes for the ASF runs counter to African ownership in that it imposes European trainers to African soldiers whose experience on the ground is fresher and more relevant (Carbone, 2013, p. 119; Franke, 2009, p. 72). This preoccupation with local ownership leads to the evaluation of APF relative support to the APSA.

### APF relative support to the APSA: the alignment criterion

In order to clearly analyse the alignment criterion, I have re-examined the data provided by the APF Evaluation Report. Thus, I have taken into account other official documents to proceed to the evaluation (see annex 1). The APF Evaluation Report (Hendrickson, et al., 2013) and Annual Report (APF, 2013) provide insights as to what the APF has achieved. All the others documents, namely the two Action Plans of the JAES (African Union/European Commission, 2007; 2010), the 2010 APSA Assessment Study (African Union, 2010)<sup>12</sup> and the 2011 APSA Support Programme (European Commission, 2011) are reports that define objectives to be met for the operationalisation of the APSA<sup>13</sup>. The APSA Assessment Study obviously provides in-depth analysis of the achievements and challenges to come for APSA operationalisation. Yet, as it is a document that was commissioned by the AU, it considers such operationalisation from an African point of view and not all the issues it raises are relevant for the APF. Table 2 compares the problems identified within the APSA Assessment Study with the issues I am focusing on (see annex 1).

Table 2. Comparison of the issues raised in the APSA Assessment Study with my own classification

APSA Assessment Study	My own classification (see annex 1)	
	APSA Components	Other issues
Vertical coordination <i>[between the AU and RECs/RMs]</i>	ASF + CEWS	coordination AU-RECs/RMs
Horizontal coordination <i>[between RECs and between APSA components]</i>	all	/
Sustainability	all	staff (efficiency + salaries)
Subsidiarity	ASF + CEWS	coordination AU-RECs/RMs + staff (efficiency)
Coherence <i>[comprehensive configuration of APSA + interdependence between APSA components]</i>	all	comprehensive APSA
Partnership <i>[between the AU, RECs/RMs, and external actors]</i>	all	all

The APF Evaluation Report (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, pp. 37-42) states that alignment with AU and

12 I could have considered the APSA Roadmap that was adopted to establish priorities for further APSA operationalisation. Yet, since this roadmap is based upon the APSA Assessment Study, I have taken for granted that the priorities put forth by the roadmap are the very ones highlighted in the assessment study.

13 As the objectives defined in the APSA Support Programme (a European document) are informed by African needs and previous joint meetings, it is assumed that this document reflect African priorities.

RECs/RMs objectives has overall been respected because “the AU request to establish the APF was made within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture” and because APF-funded activities was based on priorities identified in the APSA roadmap and beneficiaries' needs. Furthermore, a report by the German Development Institute (Klingebiel, et al., 2008, p. 84) makes the claim that the APF is aligned on the ground that it funds activities only at the request of the AU. However, Annex 1 provides a critical analysis of APF disconnection from African priorities.

A glance at APF support towards each component of the APSA indeed shows that the PSC has benefited the most from APF funding. As such, the European approach has not taken into account the results of the APSA Assessment Study (African Union, 2010, p. 64) highlighting the need for greater horizontal coordination between all components of the APSA. Besides, the APF has made tangible contributions to the development of the ASF. While this is in keeping with African demands that the ASF be quickly operational<sup>14</sup>, it runs counter to the need for the APSA to be as comprehensive as possible to tackle all aspects of security and to deal with all stages of conflict. As regards the latter objective, the EU has done nothing on capacity-building apart from support provided to the CEWS and efforts to improve the civilian aspects of the ASF. But in light of EU's experience in civilian crisis management, this falls far short of reasonable expectations.

On the other hand, other areas of support show a great deal of alignment between APF activities and African priorities. When it comes to AU coordination with the RECs/RMs for instance, what the APSA Assessment Study (African Union, 2010, p. 62) calls vertical coordination, APF support is deemed rather consistent with African priorities. Indeed, all official documents urge the AU to adopt more assertive an approach as regards strategic guidance and subsidiarity, while additional coordination mechanisms should complement the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed between the AU and the RECs/RMs in 2008 (Bergeon, 2009, p. 8). Therefore, the APF has financed Liaison Offices between the AU and the RECs/RMs, thus leaving the AU in the driver's seat while contributing to better vertical coordination. Staffing levels is also an area where alignment is respected, with the APF contributing to paying the salaries of AUC personnel as well as helping improve the recruitment procedures. These actions address what the APSA Assessment Study (African Union, 2010, p. 71) qualifies as a matter of priority.

Finally, financial management is a peculiar area of APF support as regards alignment. It has been stressed by the APSA Assessment Study (African Union, 2010) as a problem, albeit not an urgent one, to deal with, but none of the JAES Action Plans mention it. In the APSA Support Programme (European Commission, 2011), on the other hand, extensive details are provided as to how the EU is to contribute to improve financial management of the African partners. As such, the priority put on this issue seems to mainly come from the European side. So far, the mistrust the EU has towards most AU and RECs/RMs structures in terms of financial management has led it to impose its financial procedures on them<sup>15</sup>. Therefore, alignment is closely associated to ownership issues in the latter case<sup>16</sup>.

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14 It was supposed to be by 2010, and this deadline has subsequently been extended to 2015 (Rye Olsen, 2009, p. 10)

15 Only the AUC and the COMESA have successfully passed the four-pillar assessment (African Union, 2010, pp. 8-9)

16 It should be noted that the EU was originally in favour of supporting the APSA through budget support, the mode of delivery which is the most respectful of ownership and alignment as it has the money disbursed has no specific purpose and can be used by the recipients as they wish. However, it is due to the negative results the African partners had at the four-pillar assessments that the EU reconsidered its options and opted for financial support (Klingebiel, et al., 2008, p. 84)

**APF relative support to the APSA: the ownership criterion**

When it comes to the ownership criterion, the APF Evaluation Report (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, p. 47) presents a mixed picture and argues that “[t]here has been extensive and regular political dialogue between the EU and African stakeholders from the inception of the APF [...]. This has strengthened both Africa-EU partnership and given African institutions an enhanced role in management of the APF, but has not been accompanied by adequate EU monitoring of or programme support for APF activities”. It is true that APF support to the APSA is based on joint documents that underpin the Afro-EU partnership, most notably the JAES and its two Actions Plans<sup>17</sup>. But as Pirozzi (2009, p. 7) puts it, “the rhetoric of partnership between equals has been challenged by [...] the need for material support by the EU”. Indeed, it has been noted in the APSA Assessment Study (African Union, 2010, p. 69) that over-reliance on external support casts doubts on the ownership of the process.

Equally problematic with regards to ownership is the fact that APF funds should be disbursed at the request of the AU and the RECs/RMs: it should be a demand-driven process (Bergeon, 2009, p. 7; Brosig, 2013, p. 300). But since the APSA is in huge need of capacities, all EU programmes are likely to be accepted by African leaders. The Amani training cycle is a prime example of African ownership lacking in face of a simple renaming of a French initiative (Pirozzi, 2009, p. 37). As Brosig (2013, p. 300) puts it, “in some situations the EU would be forced to either generate ownership before engaging in capacity-building or limit its engagement until ownership has grown from below”. The APF Evaluation Report (Hendrickson, et al., 2013, pp. 10-14) has also stressed this issue by urging African partners to lead on developing a strategic and well-prioritised approach for APSA operationalisation. But Bergeon (2009, p. 7) has a good point when underlining the fact that in order for the AU and RECs/RMs to lead on this task, they need to have adequate personnel to formulate their demand. The capacity-building vicious circle highlighted by Carbone (2013) thus proves to be a disturbing reality.

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17 In this respect, the APSA Support Programme (European Commission, 2011, p. 1) is no exception as the method of implementation is clearly defined as follows: “Project approach – joint management with the African Union and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms as implementing partners”

## Conclusions

There is no doubt that the APF has provided substantial support to APSA operationalisation. Nevertheless, evaluation of both APF absolute and relative support to the APSA reveals some shortcomings in the European approach. These mainly stem from the discrepancy between what the EU is doing for the APSA all else being equal, and what it is doing for the APSA with regard to African priorities.

While European support provided to the ASF is considered rather positively at the absolute level because of a refocusing of the EURORECAMP on civilian aspects, it is still criticised for not engaging enough in all aspects of crisis management. As such, while the Europeanisation of the French initiative constitutes a success when compared to the situation if the EU had not acted (impact criterion), it is too little an achievement in light of what the EU could have done to meet African priorities (alignment criterion). The reversed discrepancy is also true. In the area of AU-RECs/RMs coordination for instance, EU privileged support to the AU has been criticised at the absolute level because it leaves RECs/RMs at uneven development stages. On the contrary, such approach is in keeping with African expectations to have the AU lead on the coordination process with RECs/RMs. In other words, the financing of Liaison Offices between the AU and the RECs/RMs is considered insufficient as far as EU's involvement is concerned (impact criterion), but it is a good way to act without crushing AU's leadership (ownership criterion).

This paper had two purposes. First, it provided an overview of the institutional dynamics characterising Euro-Africa cooperation as regards the operationalisation of the APSA with a specific focus on the APF. Secondly, the paper sought to evaluate the APF capacity-building pillar, both in terms of its absolute impact in the area of peace and security in Africa and as regards its performance in relation to African priorities. The ambitions of this paper were limited and the results presented must be considered with critical distance. Further research should be done as regards APF performance as such and APF interaction with international, European and African actors and processes so as to provide a full picture of the stakes surrounding Euro-Africa cooperation in the operationalisation of the APSA.

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Categories of support <sup>1</sup>		APF OBJECTIVES					APF ACHIEVEMENTS	
		1 <sup>st</sup> Action Plan of JAES (2007)	APSA Assessment Study (2010) <sup>2</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Action Plan of JAES (2010)	APSA Support Programme (2011)	APF Evaluation Report (2012)	APF Annual Report (2013)	
APSA components	PSC	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- limited coordination between PSC and similar organs in the RECs</li> <li>- limited coordination with other APSA components</li> <li>- limited institutional support (overstretched secretariat)</li> </ul>	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- more synergy between PSC and RECs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- crucial contribution to empowering the PSC</li> </ul>	/	
	CEWS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- work towards the operationalisation of the CEWS and facilitate cooperation between the AU Situation Room and corresponding structures in the EU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- slow and uneven development of EWS in the RECs</li> <li>- shortcomings in terms of IT capacity, political analysis and formulation of responses</li> <li>- over-reliance on external support which tends to favour a limited set of RECs instead of the CEWS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- enhance coordination between the CEWS and the related regional mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- capacity of CEWS to anticipate and prevent conflicts should be enhanced</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- considerable contribution through salary support for the CEWS and coordination meetings between CEWS and regional EWS</li> </ul>	/	
	ASF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- work towards the operationalisation of the ASF and its civilian dimension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- uneven development between RECs, and between RECs and the AU</li> <li>- uneven development between military/police and civilian components</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- improve the capacities of African training centres</li> <li>- develop concepts related to ASF in general (e.g. rapid deployment, logistics, maritime components)</li> <li>- organise a second training cycle taking into account lessons learned from AMANI Africa</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ASF initial operational capability should be attained by 2015</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- limited but tangible support by helping establish mission planning cells</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU support to the AMANI AFRICA II joint training programme (2012-2015)</li> <li>- EU support to African training centres (continental and regional levels)</li> <li>- EU contracting an expert acting as project manager for ASF assessment</li> </ul>	
	POW	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- uneven development between the AU and the RECs</li> </ul>	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the PoW and mediation structures should function optimally</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- average support provided by the APF</li> </ul>	/	
her iss stat Cyf + Els	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Facilitate training courses, exchanges of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- increase the staffing level of the AUC should be addressed</li> </ul>	/	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- strong project management both at AU and REC level should</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- staff salary paid by the APF in the PSD and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU contributing to paying the salaries of</li> </ul>		

<b>financial management</b>	<i>experts and joint seminars at all levels</i>	<i>as a matter of priority</i>		<i>be improved</i>	the RECs/RMs - APF helped in AU recruitment procedures	AUC personnel - EU contracting an expert conducting a management workshop
	- progress on financial management has been realised at all levels but remains far from international best standards, which hampers further external support'	- adoption of an APSA /	- need to adapt funding modalities to the particularities of each REC/RM - need to train AU staff to EDF procedures - need to minimise the transaction costs by adopting aid-recipient procedures or by harmonising individual donor procedures - financial management should be operational - upgrading of the Peace and Security Finance Unit to a Division (Head and additional personnel	- strong EU contribution to improve the financial management capacity of the PSD	- EU contracting experts to help on financial management (APF Expert Pool)	
<b>Coordination AU-RECs/RMs</b>	- organise specific and regular co-ordination meetings	- the AU should provide strategic guidance for the overall functioning of the APSA in order to ensure subsidiarity	- adoption of an APSA Roadmap - set priorities and timelimes for the implementation of the Roadmap	- AU leadership role as regards the entire APSA needs to be strengthened - consultations between RECs/RMs should be promoted	EU financing Liaison Offices between the AU and the RECs/RMs - funding of activities involving coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs (at ASF and CEWS level)	EU financing Liaison Offices between the AU and the RECs/RMs
<b>comprehensive APSA</b>	- enhance capacity-building regarding the implementation of the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development	- need to adopt a holistic and flexible approach of security to address issues such as terrorism, piracy, and SSR	- develop concepts related to other security issues (e.g. SSR, DDR, SALW, counter-terrorism)	- need to enhance the capacity to develop and implement strategies in the other peace and security areas	- broadening of the APF through the ERM to encompass all dimensions of security and tackle all stages of conflict	/

**African document**

**European documents**

**Joint documents**

achievements

challenges ahead

<sup>1</sup>: this is not an exhaustive list but those categories reflect the major trends

<sup>2</sup>: only challenges/achievements relevant to EU's support have been reviewed here

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